Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

Haelim Anderson; Daniel Barth; Dong Beom Choi

doi:s://www.fdic.gov/

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Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

10/15/2018
By Haelim Anderson ; Daniel Barth ; Dong Beom Choi
Series: Center for Financial Research Working Paper
Research Publications

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Details:

Alternative Title:

No. 2018-5
Publisher's site:

https://www.fdic.gov/
Personal Author:

Haelim Anderson ; Daniel Barth ; Dong Beom Choi

Haelim Anderson ; Daniel Barth ; Dong Beom Choi Less -
Corporate Authors:

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Pages in Document:

62
Series:

Center for Financial Research Working Paper
Dataset Download URL:

https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/cfr/working-papers/2018/cfr-wp2018-05.pdf
Format:

PDF
Main Document Checksum:

[+]

urn:sha256:c3cb6cfd8cf0bc8dc860a3083ccfcc2a641d2ada45dbd3d81d0c2ab7788cb6eb
Download URL:

https://archive.fdic.gov/view/fdic/11939/fdic_11939_DS1.pdf
File Type:

[PDF-612.35 KB]