32931Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 130 / Thursday, July 9, 2009 / Notices
1 The purchase or acquisition of a failed
depository institution in receivership refers to the
purchase of the deposit liabilities, or both such
liabilities and assets.
be isolated from the rest of the
collection system. The facility also
states that by doing this, wells EW2,
EW3, EW4R, EW8 and EW9R will have
no vacuum applied and will remain off
during the duration of the construction,
expected to last until July 15, 2006.
A: Yes. EPA approves County’s
request for an alternative timeline and
alternative operation under NSPS
subpart WWW, for wells EW2, EW3,
EW4R, EW8, and EW9R.
Dated: June 8, 2009.
Lisa Lund,
Director, Office of Compliance.
[FR Doc. E9–16274 Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
Notice of Agency Meeting
Pursuant to the provisions of the
‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (5
U.S.C. 552b), notice is hereby given that
at 11:55 a.m. on Thursday, July 2, 2009,
the Board of Directors of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation met in
closed session to consider a matter
related to the Corporation’s corporate,
supervisory, and resolution activities.
In calling the meeting, the Board
determined, on motion of Vice
Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg,
seconded by Director John E. Bowman
(Acting Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision), concurred in by Director
John C. Dugan (Comptroller of the
Currency), Director Thomas J. Curry
(Appointive), and Chairman Sheila C.
Bair, that Corporation business required
its consideration of the matter which
was to be the subject of this meeting on
less than seven days’ notice to the
public; that no earlier notice of the
meeting was practicable; that the public
interest did not require consideration of
the matter in a meeting open to public
observation; and that the matter could
be considered in a closed meeting by
authority of subsection (c)(9)(B) of the
‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (5
U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B)).
The meeting was held in the Board
Room of the FDIC Building located at
550—17th Street, NW., Washington, DC.
Dated: July 6, 2009.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9–16171 Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
RIN 3064–AD47
Proposed Statement of Policy on
Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Proposed statement of policy
with request for comment.
SUMMARY: The FDIC is proposing to
issue a Statement of Policy on
Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions (Proposed Policy
Statement) to provide guidance to
private capital investors interested in
acquiring or investing in failed insured
depository institutions regarding the
terms and conditions for such
investments or acquisitions. This
Proposed Policy Statement is being
published with a request for comment
in order to obtain the public’s views on
the provisions of the policy statement
before it becomes effective.
DATES: Comments must be received by
the FDIC no later than August 10, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
on the Proposed Policy Statement by
any of the following methods:
• Agency Web Site: http://
www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/notices.html. Follow
instructions for submitting comments
on the agency Web site.
• E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov.
Include RIN # 3064–AD47 on the
subject line of the message.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Secretary, Attention: Comments, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery: Comments may be
hand delivered to the guard station at
the rear of the 550 17th Street Building
(located on F Street) on business days
between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Instructions: All comments received
will be posted generally without change
to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/propose.html, including any
personal information provided.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Catherine Topping, Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 898–3975 or
ctopping@fdic.gov, Charles A. Fulton,
Counsel, Legal Division, (703) 562–2424
or chfulton@fdic.gov, or Mindy West,
Chief, Policy and Program Development,
Division of Supervision and Consumer
Protection, (202) 898–7221 or
miwest@fdic.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
I. Background
Recently, private capital investors
have indicated interest in purchasing
insured depository institutions in
receivership.1 The FDIC is particularly
concerned that owners of banks and
thrifts, whether they are individuals,
partnerships, limited liability
companies, or corporations, have the
experience, competence, and
willingness to run the bank in a prudent
manner, and accept the responsibility to
support their banks when they face
difficulties and protect them from
insider transactions.
Especially in light of the increased
number of bank and thrift failures, and
the consequent increase in interest by
potential acquirers, the FDIC has
evaluated the policies that apply in
deciding whether a prospective
acquisition is appropriate. The FDIC has
reviewed various elements of private
capital investment structures and
considers that some of these investment
structures raise potential safety and
soundness considerations and risks to
the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) as
well as important issues with respect to
their compliance with the requirements
applied by the FDIC in its decision on
the granting of deposit insurance. The
concerns center on the need for fully
adequate capital, a source of financial
and managerial strength for the
depository institution, and the potential
adverse effects of extensions of credit to
affiliates. These structuring issues are
present with respect to any new
proposed acquisition of a failed insured
depository institution.
The FDIC is seeking public input on
this Proposed Policy Statement. This
guidance describes the terms and
conditions that private capital investors
would be expected to satisfy to obtain
eligibility for a proposed acquisition
structure. These measures would cover
capital support and cross guarantees;
transactions with affiliates; secrecy
jurisdiction investors; continuity of
ownership requirements, and
disclosure.
II. Request for Public Comment
The FDIC invites comments on all
aspects of the Proposed Policy
Statement, including the following
questions:
1. The measures contained in the
Proposed Policy Statement will not be
applied to individuals, partnerships,
limited liability companies, or
corporations, that accept the
VerDate Nov<24>2008 15:49 Jul 08, 2009 Jkt 217001 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\09JYN1.SGM 09JYN1
rmajette on DSK29S0YB1 with NOTICES
1 The purchase or acquisition of a failed
depository institution in receivership refers to the
purchase of the deposit liabilities, or both such
liabilities and assets.
be isolated from the rest of the
collection system. The facility also
states that by doing this, wells EW2,
EW3, EW4R, EW8 and EW9R will have
no vacuum applied and will remain off
during the duration of the construction,
expected to last until July 15, 2006.
A: Yes. EPA approves County’s
request for an alternative timeline and
alternative operation under NSPS
subpart WWW, for wells EW2, EW3,
EW4R, EW8, and EW9R.
Dated: June 8, 2009.
Lisa Lund,
Director, Office of Compliance.
[FR Doc. E9–16274 Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
Notice of Agency Meeting
Pursuant to the provisions of the
‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (5
U.S.C. 552b), notice is hereby given that
at 11:55 a.m. on Thursday, July 2, 2009,
the Board of Directors of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation met in
closed session to consider a matter
related to the Corporation’s corporate,
supervisory, and resolution activities.
In calling the meeting, the Board
determined, on motion of Vice
Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg,
seconded by Director John E. Bowman
(Acting Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision), concurred in by Director
John C. Dugan (Comptroller of the
Currency), Director Thomas J. Curry
(Appointive), and Chairman Sheila C.
Bair, that Corporation business required
its consideration of the matter which
was to be the subject of this meeting on
less than seven days’ notice to the
public; that no earlier notice of the
meeting was practicable; that the public
interest did not require consideration of
the matter in a meeting open to public
observation; and that the matter could
be considered in a closed meeting by
authority of subsection (c)(9)(B) of the
‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (5
U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B)).
The meeting was held in the Board
Room of the FDIC Building located at
550—17th Street, NW., Washington, DC.
Dated: July 6, 2009.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9–16171 Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
RIN 3064–AD47
Proposed Statement of Policy on
Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Proposed statement of policy
with request for comment.
SUMMARY: The FDIC is proposing to
issue a Statement of Policy on
Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions (Proposed Policy
Statement) to provide guidance to
private capital investors interested in
acquiring or investing in failed insured
depository institutions regarding the
terms and conditions for such
investments or acquisitions. This
Proposed Policy Statement is being
published with a request for comment
in order to obtain the public’s views on
the provisions of the policy statement
before it becomes effective.
DATES: Comments must be received by
the FDIC no later than August 10, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
on the Proposed Policy Statement by
any of the following methods:
• Agency Web Site: http://
www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/notices.html. Follow
instructions for submitting comments
on the agency Web site.
• E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov.
Include RIN # 3064–AD47 on the
subject line of the message.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Secretary, Attention: Comments, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery: Comments may be
hand delivered to the guard station at
the rear of the 550 17th Street Building
(located on F Street) on business days
between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Instructions: All comments received
will be posted generally without change
to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/propose.html, including any
personal information provided.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Catherine Topping, Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 898–3975 or
ctopping@fdic.gov, Charles A. Fulton,
Counsel, Legal Division, (703) 562–2424
or chfulton@fdic.gov, or Mindy West,
Chief, Policy and Program Development,
Division of Supervision and Consumer
Protection, (202) 898–7221 or
miwest@fdic.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
I. Background
Recently, private capital investors
have indicated interest in purchasing
insured depository institutions in
receivership.1 The FDIC is particularly
concerned that owners of banks and
thrifts, whether they are individuals,
partnerships, limited liability
companies, or corporations, have the
experience, competence, and
willingness to run the bank in a prudent
manner, and accept the responsibility to
support their banks when they face
difficulties and protect them from
insider transactions.
Especially in light of the increased
number of bank and thrift failures, and
the consequent increase in interest by
potential acquirers, the FDIC has
evaluated the policies that apply in
deciding whether a prospective
acquisition is appropriate. The FDIC has
reviewed various elements of private
capital investment structures and
considers that some of these investment
structures raise potential safety and
soundness considerations and risks to
the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) as
well as important issues with respect to
their compliance with the requirements
applied by the FDIC in its decision on
the granting of deposit insurance. The
concerns center on the need for fully
adequate capital, a source of financial
and managerial strength for the
depository institution, and the potential
adverse effects of extensions of credit to
affiliates. These structuring issues are
present with respect to any new
proposed acquisition of a failed insured
depository institution.
The FDIC is seeking public input on
this Proposed Policy Statement. This
guidance describes the terms and
conditions that private capital investors
would be expected to satisfy to obtain
eligibility for a proposed acquisition
structure. These measures would cover
capital support and cross guarantees;
transactions with affiliates; secrecy
jurisdiction investors; continuity of
ownership requirements, and
disclosure.
II. Request for Public Comment
The FDIC invites comments on all
aspects of the Proposed Policy
Statement, including the following
questions:
1. The measures contained in the
Proposed Policy Statement will not be
applied to individuals, partnerships,
limited liability companies, or
corporations, that accept the
VerDate Nov<24>2008 15:49 Jul 08, 2009 Jkt 217001 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\09JYN1.SGM 09JYN1
rmajette on DSK29S0YB1 with NOTICES
32932 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 130 / Thursday, July 9, 2009 / Notices
responsibilities under existing law to
serve as responsible custodians of the
public interest that is inherent in
insured depository institutions, but will
be applied to (a) private capital
investors in certain companies,
proposing to assume deposit liabilities,
or both such liabilities and assets, from
a failed insured depository institution in
receivership (including all entities in
such an ownership chain) and to (b)
applicants for insurance in the case of
de novo charters issued in connection
with the resolution of failed insured
depository institutions (hereinafter
‘‘Investors’’). Is some other definition
more appropriate?
2. The Proposed Policy Statement
indicates that so-called ‘‘silo’’ structures
would not be considered to be eligible
bidders for failed bank assets and
liabilities since under these structures
beneficial ownership cannot be
ascertained, the responsible parties for
making decisions are not clearly
identified, and/or ownership and
control are separated. Are there any
reasons why they should be considered
to be eligible bidders?
3. One of the most important elements
in the Proposed Policy Statement is the
requirement that the acquired
depository institution be very well
capitalized. The text requires a Tier 1
leverage ratio of 15 percent, that this
ratio be maintained for a period of at
least 3 years, and thereafter that the
capital of the insured depository
institution remain at a ‘‘well
capitalized’’ level. The capital adequacy
of depository institutions formed from
assets and/or liabilities acquired from
failed banks in receivership is a matter
of crucial importance for reasons of
safety and soundness and for protection
of the Deposit Insurance Fund. This is
especially important in the case of
newly established banks that, as a
general matter, have a weak record of
performance in the early years of
activity.
In view of these considerations it has
been suggested that a Tier 1 leverage
ratio of 15 percent included in the text
of the Proposed Policy Statement is
entirely necessary and appropriate for at
least some minimum period after the
new depository institution acquisition.
On the other hand, it has also been
suggested that safety and soundness
considerations can be satisfied with a
lower, but a still high level, of Tier 1
capital more in line with the level
normally applicable to bank or thrift
investors subject to prudential
regulation, activities restrictions and
that serve as a source of strength for
their subsidiary institutions. It is also
suggested that exceeding such normal
capital levels could have the effect of
making investments in the assets and
liabilities of failed banks and thrifts
uncompetitive and uneconomic.
The FDIC seeks to accomplish both
objectives in setting initial capital
requirements for failed bank asset and
liability acquisitions under this
Proposed Policy Statement. Clearly, a
high level, above normal levels, is
necessary to deal with the unusual
circumstances facing banking
institutions, especially new banking
institutions, today. The FDIC seeks the
views of commenters on the appropriate
level of initial capital that will satisfy
safety and soundness concerns without
making investments in the assets and
liabilities of failed banks and thrifts
uncompetitive and uneconomic.
As noted above, the text of the
Proposed Policy Statement requires an
initial Tier 1 leverage ratio of 15
percent, that this ratio be maintained for
a period of at least 3 years, and
thereafter that the capital of the insured
depository institution remain at a ‘‘well
capitalized’’ level. Should there be a
further requirement that if capital
declines below the required capital
level, the institution would be treated as
‘‘undercapitalized’’ for purposes of
Prompt Corrective Action and the
institution’s regulator would have
available all the measures that would be
available in such a situation?
4. Should the Source of Strength
commitment included in the Proposed
Policy Statement be retained in the final
policy statement? Should the
commitment be enhanced to require
from the shell holding company and/or
the Investors a broader obligation than
only a commitment to raise additional
equity or engage in capital qualifying
borrowing?
5. Should the Cross Guarantee
commitment included in the Proposed
Policy Statement be retained in the final
policy statement? Should the
commitment contained in the Proposed
Policy Statement be enhanced by
requiring a direct obligation of the
Investors?
6. The Proposed Policy Statement
limits the use of entities in an
ownership structure that are domiciled
in bank secrecy jurisdictions unless the
investors are subsidiaries of companies
that are subject to comprehensive
consolidated supervision as recognized
by the Federal Reserve Board. Should
entities established in bank secrecy
jurisdictions be considered to be eligible
bidders even without being subject to
comprehensive consolidated
supervision?
7. Under the Proposed Policy
Statement, Investors would be
prohibited from selling or otherwise
transferring securities of the Investors’
holding company or depository
institution for a 3 year period of time
following the acquisition absent the
FDIC’s prior approval. Is 3 years the
correct period of time for limiting sales,
or should the period be shorter or
longer?
8. The Proposed Policy Statement
provides that Investors that directly or
indirectly hold 10 percent or more of
the equity of a bank or thrift in
receivership would not be considered
eligible to be a bidder to become an
investor in the deposit liabilities, or
both such liabilities and assets, of that
failed depository institution. Is this
exclusion from bidding eligibility
appropriate on the basis of the need to
assure fairness among all bidders and to
avoid an incentive for the 10 percent or
more Investor to seek to take advantage
of the potential availability of loss
sharing by the FDIC if the subsidiary
bank or thrift enters into a receivership?
9. Should the limitations in this
Proposed Policy Statement be lifted
after a certain number of years of
successful operation of a bank or thrift
holding company? If so, what would be
the appropriate timeframe for lifting the
conditions? What other criteria should
apply? Should all or only some of the
conditions be lifted?
III. Text of Proposed Policy Statement
The text of the Proposed Statement of
Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions follows:
Proposed Statement of Policy on
Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions
Introduction
Capital investments by individuals
and limited liability companies acting
through holding companies operating
within a well developed prudential
framework has long been the dominant
form of ownership of insured depository
institutions. From the perspective of the
FDIC’s interest as insurer and supervisor
of insured depository institutions, this
framework has included, in particular,
measures aimed at maintaining well
capitalized bank and thrift institutions,
support for these banks when they face
difficulties, and protections against
insider transactions. The ability of the
owners to provide financial support to
depository institutions with adequate
capital and management expertise are
essential safeguards. These safeguards
are particularly appropriate for owners
of insured depository institutions given
the important benefits conferred on
VerDate Nov<24>2008 15:49 Jul 08, 2009 Jkt 217001 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\09JYN1.SGM 09JYN1
rmajette on DSK29S0YB1 with NOTICES
responsibilities under existing law to
serve as responsible custodians of the
public interest that is inherent in
insured depository institutions, but will
be applied to (a) private capital
investors in certain companies,
proposing to assume deposit liabilities,
or both such liabilities and assets, from
a failed insured depository institution in
receivership (including all entities in
such an ownership chain) and to (b)
applicants for insurance in the case of
de novo charters issued in connection
with the resolution of failed insured
depository institutions (hereinafter
‘‘Investors’’). Is some other definition
more appropriate?
2. The Proposed Policy Statement
indicates that so-called ‘‘silo’’ structures
would not be considered to be eligible
bidders for failed bank assets and
liabilities since under these structures
beneficial ownership cannot be
ascertained, the responsible parties for
making decisions are not clearly
identified, and/or ownership and
control are separated. Are there any
reasons why they should be considered
to be eligible bidders?
3. One of the most important elements
in the Proposed Policy Statement is the
requirement that the acquired
depository institution be very well
capitalized. The text requires a Tier 1
leverage ratio of 15 percent, that this
ratio be maintained for a period of at
least 3 years, and thereafter that the
capital of the insured depository
institution remain at a ‘‘well
capitalized’’ level. The capital adequacy
of depository institutions formed from
assets and/or liabilities acquired from
failed banks in receivership is a matter
of crucial importance for reasons of
safety and soundness and for protection
of the Deposit Insurance Fund. This is
especially important in the case of
newly established banks that, as a
general matter, have a weak record of
performance in the early years of
activity.
In view of these considerations it has
been suggested that a Tier 1 leverage
ratio of 15 percent included in the text
of the Proposed Policy Statement is
entirely necessary and appropriate for at
least some minimum period after the
new depository institution acquisition.
On the other hand, it has also been
suggested that safety and soundness
considerations can be satisfied with a
lower, but a still high level, of Tier 1
capital more in line with the level
normally applicable to bank or thrift
investors subject to prudential
regulation, activities restrictions and
that serve as a source of strength for
their subsidiary institutions. It is also
suggested that exceeding such normal
capital levels could have the effect of
making investments in the assets and
liabilities of failed banks and thrifts
uncompetitive and uneconomic.
The FDIC seeks to accomplish both
objectives in setting initial capital
requirements for failed bank asset and
liability acquisitions under this
Proposed Policy Statement. Clearly, a
high level, above normal levels, is
necessary to deal with the unusual
circumstances facing banking
institutions, especially new banking
institutions, today. The FDIC seeks the
views of commenters on the appropriate
level of initial capital that will satisfy
safety and soundness concerns without
making investments in the assets and
liabilities of failed banks and thrifts
uncompetitive and uneconomic.
As noted above, the text of the
Proposed Policy Statement requires an
initial Tier 1 leverage ratio of 15
percent, that this ratio be maintained for
a period of at least 3 years, and
thereafter that the capital of the insured
depository institution remain at a ‘‘well
capitalized’’ level. Should there be a
further requirement that if capital
declines below the required capital
level, the institution would be treated as
‘‘undercapitalized’’ for purposes of
Prompt Corrective Action and the
institution’s regulator would have
available all the measures that would be
available in such a situation?
4. Should the Source of Strength
commitment included in the Proposed
Policy Statement be retained in the final
policy statement? Should the
commitment be enhanced to require
from the shell holding company and/or
the Investors a broader obligation than
only a commitment to raise additional
equity or engage in capital qualifying
borrowing?
5. Should the Cross Guarantee
commitment included in the Proposed
Policy Statement be retained in the final
policy statement? Should the
commitment contained in the Proposed
Policy Statement be enhanced by
requiring a direct obligation of the
Investors?
6. The Proposed Policy Statement
limits the use of entities in an
ownership structure that are domiciled
in bank secrecy jurisdictions unless the
investors are subsidiaries of companies
that are subject to comprehensive
consolidated supervision as recognized
by the Federal Reserve Board. Should
entities established in bank secrecy
jurisdictions be considered to be eligible
bidders even without being subject to
comprehensive consolidated
supervision?
7. Under the Proposed Policy
Statement, Investors would be
prohibited from selling or otherwise
transferring securities of the Investors’
holding company or depository
institution for a 3 year period of time
following the acquisition absent the
FDIC’s prior approval. Is 3 years the
correct period of time for limiting sales,
or should the period be shorter or
longer?
8. The Proposed Policy Statement
provides that Investors that directly or
indirectly hold 10 percent or more of
the equity of a bank or thrift in
receivership would not be considered
eligible to be a bidder to become an
investor in the deposit liabilities, or
both such liabilities and assets, of that
failed depository institution. Is this
exclusion from bidding eligibility
appropriate on the basis of the need to
assure fairness among all bidders and to
avoid an incentive for the 10 percent or
more Investor to seek to take advantage
of the potential availability of loss
sharing by the FDIC if the subsidiary
bank or thrift enters into a receivership?
9. Should the limitations in this
Proposed Policy Statement be lifted
after a certain number of years of
successful operation of a bank or thrift
holding company? If so, what would be
the appropriate timeframe for lifting the
conditions? What other criteria should
apply? Should all or only some of the
conditions be lifted?
III. Text of Proposed Policy Statement
The text of the Proposed Statement of
Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions follows:
Proposed Statement of Policy on
Qualifications for Failed Bank
Acquisitions
Introduction
Capital investments by individuals
and limited liability companies acting
through holding companies operating
within a well developed prudential
framework has long been the dominant
form of ownership of insured depository
institutions. From the perspective of the
FDIC’s interest as insurer and supervisor
of insured depository institutions, this
framework has included, in particular,
measures aimed at maintaining well
capitalized bank and thrift institutions,
support for these banks when they face
difficulties, and protections against
insider transactions. The ability of the
owners to provide financial support to
depository institutions with adequate
capital and management expertise are
essential safeguards. These safeguards
are particularly appropriate for owners
of insured depository institutions given
the important benefits conferred on
VerDate Nov<24>2008 15:49 Jul 08, 2009 Jkt 217001 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\09JYN1.SGM 09JYN1
rmajette on DSK29S0YB1 with NOTICES